. . .let more than mere opinion reach you
through me.
—Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy
But today, the average man, because of
historical ignorance finds himself almost like a primitive,
almost like the original man, and hence — other things aside
— the unexpected forms of barbarism and savagery which burst
suddenly from his old and hypercivilized soul.
—Jose Ortega y Gasset
When I read that, during the Great Leap
Forward, in China, between twenty and forty million had
died, I thought this must be the apotheosis of statistical
whimsicality, until a short time later the news that
“between twenty and eighty million had died during the
Cultural Revolution.”
……
We ourselves are the prisoners of these
numbers, these figures, the statistics — the millions; and
millions upon millions. Is it possible that our careless,
our casual, use of these “millions” is one of the reasons
for the brutality, for cruelty?
—Doris Lessing
Several years ago a college professor complained to a group of
graduate students that a freshman student claimed never to have
heard of Moses. How could someone pass through twelve years of
schooling untouched by this essential religious-historical fact? The
professor envisioned lazy and incompetent teachers failing to
satisfy the most minimal educational requirements; he probably
harbored a worse opinion of the student’s parents.
This situation is but a sample circulating through the faculties
of high schools and colleges. Personally, I have tutored college
students so deficient in geography they have located China somewhere
near the Pyrenees — a mistake worthy of Gogol’s madman — and have
taught students who mistook England for Japan on a world map. Added
to this pathetic situation, student indifference to History rivals a
past indifference to Latin and Greek, an indifference which really
killed the dead languages.
“I knew things were bad,” my professor remarked, “but are they
really this bad?”
Things may not be as bad as he feared. The poor achievements of
American students documented in E.D. Hirsch’s
CULTURAL LITERACY may exasperate the teacher,
and drive the History teacher in particular to despair, but the
official assessments of cultural and other illiteracies may be the
benign side of the problem. Things may be worse in a way not yet
considered.
For instance, our “Moses” student could have had the Old
Testament read to him when he was a child; indeed, on television one
evening he may have seen Charlton Heston (whom the student only
knows as President of the National Rifle Association) part the Red
Sea. The special effects, however, may be better remembered than the
man who was being dramatized. And the student may have heard of the
Exodus from Egypt between Ren and Stimpy cartoons and
Gilligan’s Island reruns. Moses, again, may have come to his
brief attention but amidst Play Station, skateboarding, and The Back
Street Boys. Thus, upon reaching the college classroom, taking a
course he would have normally avoided but which was required, my
professor mentioned Moses in passing. Upon which, the student raised
his hand and asked who this man was.
When you consider the quantity of information filling the average
student’s mental reservoir in the first eighteen years, what he or
she remembers tends toward the arbitrary and the increasingly
unexceptional. One might question whether this student’s knowing
who Moses was would make the state of education any better. That is,
would the ostensibly well-prepared college-bound student have a
better level of historical education than the apparently
ill-prepared student?
The History teacher’s task in the “Information Age” has been made
distressing when television and the Internet are the most active
sources of our myths, folklore, and stories, without foundation in
texts. How does the teacher distinguish for the student the
historical past — events fossilized in a textbook: but also the
events forming the nucleus of the student’s personality — from the
news media, music, video games, comic strips, talk shows, magazines,
and sports? In the News realm alone, current events are interpreted
as fast as they are reported, in effect out-running History with a
brand of hyper-historicism. How can the History teacher confidently
instill in students a lasting flow of remembered time, when the
regular conditions of contemporary life militate against effective
remembering?
It would be another circumstance were the student exposed to two,
three, or four information flows, and, thus, entrance into the
Biblical stream, if you will, would have a chance of being a more
vivid experience. Instead, the confluence of numerous streams floods
the student’s mind and washes out the banks or sides that support
the historical sense. Computers, televisions, radios, telephones,
tape recorders, all of these gadgets allow him or her to obtain
information whenever he feels like it, creating an increasing
inattentiveness towards his experiences. If the teacher is not
vitally aware of these conditions, he or she will be trapped within
this same nonchalance and merely be contributing to the continued
erosion of the historical sense.
Before condemning the conditions of everyday life, we must
acknowledge that the greatest inhibitor of the development of the
historical sense has been History itself, that is, the sheer volume
of historical knowledge. I repeat: “has been.” Friedrich Nietzsche,
one hundred and thirty years ago, diagnosed this malady of History
in the second volume of his “Thoughts Out of Season,”
THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY. He focused on the excess of
History and how this excess “attacked the plastic power of life” by
crowding out the unhistorical. The unhistorical he defined as man
“going into the present” and having the power of forgetfulness.
Educators and historians in 19th
century Germany were oblivious of the fact that history served an
unhistorical power; the excess of history no longer allowed man to
act unhistorically and spontaneously. In today’s classroom, the
unhistorical is still neglected. Today, History is taught as another
information stream, a formal competitor against video docudramas and
mythologies for the student’s immediate attention, with History
disappearing into an undifferentiated confluence. Nietzsche likens
the unhistorical to “the surrounding atmosphere that can alone
create life in whose annihilation life itself disappears.”
The unhistorical is an elusive component for the history teacher,
who, upon comprehending its importance, might have trouble
describing it in action. It is difficult to pin down the
unhistorical, in the classroom or even in this essay, as if its very
appearance dispels its importance and potency. At best, we might
suggest its presence and hope for some result. The History teacher
must do more than teach History and supply the unhistorical
ingredient. How can a student leave the classroom with a sense of
the unhistorical? A few years ago, I attended a lecture entitled
“Poetry and Magic,” and one of the audience members remarked that in
some cultures the “spell” incanted for a given occasion cannot be
taught — it must be overheard — and one must acquire it by stealth
or theft. The teacher puts the student in a position to overhear the
“spell.”
Not every teacher is an historian, and it would be a great burden
to require History instruction to supply a meaningful historical
dimension. Yet, this precisely must be done. The History teacher
must do more that teach History. How the teacher might restore this
lost ingredient to the History program is one of the great lessons
suggested by the books and lectures of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy,
especially from his history, OUT OF REVOLUTION:
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN MAN.
The teaching crisis is merely a tributary of the historical
crisis which runs through the last hundred years. History teaching
feels acutely the effects of this crisis because of the symbiotic
relationship between History and Education. When Rosenstock-Huessy
discusses education in his essay “Teaching Too Late, Learning Too
Early,” he writes primarily about teaching History:
We teachers are the cultural lag of mankind. Less politely,
we are the hyenas of its battlefields, for we disembowel the
heroes of antiquity if we are left to our natural tendencies as
teachers.
We must occasionally avoid these tendencies if we want to develop
the student’s historical sense, a sense he defines thus: “Every
human being, for his own salvation, must be trained in the timing
of his own experiences” (italics added). In a paper read before
the American Historical Association in 1934
entitled “The Predicament of History,” Rosenstock-Huessy makes a
similar point:
Modern Man seems no longer to register experience without
special training. Without the capacity for keeping and
developing the process of selection which we call tradition, the
group can have no history. The power of selection which applied
by Darwin to processes in the world of animals and plants is in
reality the power of civilization. And this power can be wasted
or lost.
History. Education. Special training. History. Education. A
recirculation process. They feed one another to fortify the process.
The aforementioned crisis represents a fouling of the waters, and
History and Education today merely recirculate the poisons. An
antidote to this poisonous flow at once seems impossible to find or
not worth finding because nobody knows how to administer it. What do
we do?
Imagine a crisis generally as the last and most terrible swelling
of a social or political problem. Following the lead of the Spanish
philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, we can consider “crisis” an
historical concept. In MAN AND CRISIS, Ortega
rigorously defines historical crisis first and foremost as a
predicament of History, a peculiar historical change. He describes
this change when
the system of convictions belonging to a previous generation
gives way to a vital state in which man remains without these
convictions. Man returns to a state of not knowing what to do,
for the reason that he returns to a state of actually not
knowing what to think about the world.
Rosenstock-Huessy defines crisis in nearly the same terms in
THE ORIGIN OF SPEECH, when he
describes the four “diseases” of Speech: war, crisis, revolution,
and degeneration. “The inner crisis of a disintegrating society is
constituted by the fact that too many people inside this society are
not told what to do.” No one can be told what to do because no one
knows what to think about the world. He adds: “In crisis we wait for
anybody to tell us.”
In this book Ortega deals primarily with the Renaissance, but he
points to earlier periods, both times in ancient Rome: during the
first century before and the third century after Christ, which
suffered similar social and cultural upheavals. In pre-Christian
Rome, in a reference to Cicero, a familiar problem: “From a world
which has turned itself back into pure problem — and man is part of
that world — one cannot hope for anything positive; the substance of
life is desperation.” He quotes Cicero’s DE FINIBUS
BONORUM ET MALORUM: “‘We academicians’ — that
is to say, he, Cicero, declares himself an academician — ’are in a
desperate state from too much knowing” (italics
added). In other words, understanding that a crisis exists does not
necessarily guarantee an escape from it. The will to knowledge is
not enough. “Our Soul,” writes Rosenstock-Huessy, “overloaded with
so much past, replies by a nervous breakdown.”
The epigraphs which open this essay bespeak the seriousness and
depth of the crisis and add an imperative to the search for some
relief from our historical predicament. Doris Lessing’s passages
dwell on public indifference born from numbness to hearing about
mass murders and genocide. Reports of twenty to eighty million
killed weirdly echo a fast food chain’s promotional claims:
billions and billions sold. Rosenstock-Huessy had written that
“objectivity without gratitude for the relation of our thought to
other people’s lifeblood is intolerable.” History is transformed
into a sideshow for trivia freaks. The facts and numbers lose
reality in proportion to the frequency with which they are pressed
upon us. The truth needs a rest occasionally, or it will not have
the strength to penetrate our minds.
At some point during the slide into barbarism, our humanity is
degraded and lost. The descent does not make good headlines nor is
it distinguishable one day, one month, or one year to the next.
There are only indications that things are wrong. Concentration
camps and death chambers; tribal genocide; the gulags; death squads.
When these kinds of events have occurred, inside or outside western
nations, our response has been disingenuous. How could such savagery
happen in a world of air-conditioned buildings, organized sports,
and the general wish for all to live in peace? Only madmen would
think of starting wars — you know the usual suspects: Kim Il Sung,
Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, Khadaffi — and threaten to deny us our
luxuries. Analogously, our personal sense of security is shattered
each time we read about the latest serial killer or an otherwise
friendly neighbor who has shot the wife and kids and himself.
Unthinkable things, once suppressed by a common if fragile
humanity. We have forgotten that being born human is the most
fragile state of life. Moderated by a sensitive historical
brotherhood. Unthinkable things, now commonplace and nearly
tolerable.
Ortega’s broad comments about historically ignorant man
anticipate Lessing’s response to the statistical nightmare. Her
question: “Is it possible that our careless, our casual, use of
these ‘millions’ is one of the reasons for the brutality, the
cruelty,” realizes a discernible way we can avoid the historical
crisis. We cannot prove the connection between our attitudes and the
brutalities; her analysis resembles the associative connections a
reader makes within a short story, play, or novel and corresponds to
a process Ortega labels “historical reason,” which will be our
response to History’s breakdown.
“Do not believe any history that does not spring from the mind of
a rare spirit,” Nietzsche writes in THE USE AND ABUSE
OF HISTORY. Such a rare spirit we recognize in
Rosenstock-Huessy’s OUT OF REVOLUTION. Despite
its recognition as a great historical work, the book invites the
kind of misunderstanding offered by Crane Brinton: “Written in what
to an American seems the cloud-cuckoo-land of beautiful and inexact
ideas, choosing convenient and rejecting inconvenient facts,
something in the tradition of Spengler, but with the kindly hopes of
a man of good will.”
When Nietzsche saw the excesses of History causing a malady of
History, he proposed an antidote: the unhistorical by which he meant
“the power, the art, of forgetting and drawing a limited horizon
around oneself.” This anticipated Crane Brinton’s feeble objections
to OUT OF REVOLUTION. To the contrary
Rosenstock-Huessy increased the dose for curing the twentieth
century’s historical malady. Unfortunately, the uniqueness of
OUT OF REVOLUTION “left it high and dry on the
sands of academe.” Page Smith adds in his assessment of the book
that “[n]obody knew what to make of it because no one had seen
nothing like it.” The book, “demanded to be accepted or rejected.”
In the end, it was ignored. Again, Nietzsche best described how a
work like OUT OF REVOLUTION should be
construed: “The Delphian god cries his oracle to you at the
beginning of your wanderings: ‘Know thyself.’ It is a hard saying,
for that god ‘tells nothing and conceals nothing but merely points
the way,’ as Heraclitus said. But whither does he point?”
Where does Rosenstock-Huessy point? OUT OF
REVOLUTION’ s subtitle is one direction. It proposes the book
to be an autobiography: but that of Western Man’s, and thus “no one
man’s enterprise.” Referring to our own autobiographical
circumstance, Rosenstock-Huessy invites our collaboration: “In
adding from his own memory, whatever he knows of French, English,
Russian, or Italian history [the reader] cannot but enlarge and
round out our draft.” He points toward our own past, whence we may
organize the chaos in ourselves in thinking our way back to our true
needs.
OUT OF REVOLUTION also points to the unhistorical in the
form of an aesthetic principle: the invisible ingredient used by
Rosenstock-Huessy to bind an account of 27
generations from Gregory the Great to V.I.
Lenin. Brinton had fretted over the author’s selection of facts, but
by just looking at the book’s table of contents, he might have seen
that more than convenient choices were made. The first thing you see
is that the events will be cast in a backward chronological order,
starting with the Russian Revolution. This represents a bit of
startling inspiration, especially when one compares it to Rosenstock-
Huessy’s THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS, in which he
used a straightforward chronology, published only eight years before
OUT OF REVOLUTION. Why he changed his approach
is unclear, but the significance of the change is unmistakable.
Rosenstock- Huessy writes:
We are recording vive voce the autobiography of Europe
during the last thousand years with regard to its connection
backwards; we are convinced, however, that any history of the
evolution of mankind will prove a failure if it tries to deprive
us of the greatest contribution of the last twenty years. I mean
any history of mankind which fails to start frankly and modestly
from the experiences and sufferings of our generation.
Bruce Boston, one of the book’s principal interpreters, connects
the autobiographical element to the “backward” structure: “Rather
than viewing the great upheavals of western history as shameful
interruptions in the course of its orderly flow, [he] is prepared to
present them as exhibiting the same inner cohesion one would expect
to find in the life of a single individual.”
The aesthetic pull from OUT OF REVOLUTION’s
structure emanates from this inner cohesion. The choice of working
backward from the Russian Revolution, to invert the regular order
from which we normally discern cohesion (for instance, in a history
course in high school or college), is as profound and meaningful as
the choice by the Church Fathers to order the gospels Matthew, Mark,
Luke, and John. In Rosenstock-Huessy’s THE FRUIT OF
LIPS, OR WHY FOUR GOSPELS, he points out that
[t]he sequence of the four gospels is necessary because this
sequence reverses the order which begins with the natural
individuality of Jesus. And such a reverse of nature is the
necessary sequence in human articulation!
The gospels, he is saying, work under an aesthetic principle to
articulate a unity among them which can admit no other gospel.
Likewise, the unhistorical as an aesthetic principle should
articulate History that can admit no other information flow!
They begat each other. Every gospel begins exactly at the
point to which the previous gospel has progressed on its
tortuous path. The last word of the one is the overture and sets
the tone for the next!
If Rosenstock-Huessy’s scheme for the Gospels seems farfetched,
examine Richard Elliott Friedman’s book, THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF GOD, in which he shows how the order in
which the Old Testament was written doesn’t conform to the order we
get in the Bible; yet, Friedman describes a cohesion of which
suggests a nearly artistic or aesthetic subtlety.1
The aesthetic quality and attraction of Rosenstock-Huessy’s
OUT OF REVOLUTION is never more obvious than after viewing
Harold Pinter’s play BETRAYAL. The backward
development of the drama2 raises the
story of a conventional love triangle to a level where we can come
to terms with the vital human or individual elements of the drama.
In the case of this play, the begged question is, “Why does the
affair fail?” The backward device particularizes what was an
invisible dimension in the adulterous relationship, Time, and
articulates Time’s failure and constant betrayal of Man by changing
him.
Pinter’s characters are squashed by Time, but they never
comprehend the slow disintegration of their relationships and the
draining of their emotions. The intimacy dissolves as if it would
inevitably lead to this point — except that Pinter started
with the dissolution. Moreover, all the relationships seem tainted
by betrayal.
The characters had believed their feelings to be everlasting,
imperishable. Then Jerry falls in love with his best friend’s wife
and speaks of satisfying his desires instantly in the present, as if
he could defeat time’s betrayal. He has just cornered Emma in a
bedroom. The speech occurs at play’s end.
Jerry . Look at the way you’re looking at me. I can’t wait
for you, I’m bowled over, I’m totally knocked out, you dazzle
me, you jewel, my jewel, I can’t ever sleep again, no, listen,
it’s the truth, I won’t walk, I’ll be a cripple, I’ll descend,
I’ll diminish, into total paralysis, my life is in your hands,
that’s what you’re banishing me to, a state of catatonia, do you
know the state of catatonia? do you? the state of. . .where the
reigning prince is the prince of emptiness, the prince of
absence, the prince of desolation. I love you.
This passage actually describes Jerry at the play’s beginning
when he meets Emma for the first time since the breakup of his
marriage. He’s desolate, empty, lost. While all the characters feel
betrayed or seem to have been betrayed, Jerry suffers the deepest
funk because he has failed the most to adapt to the change of
feeling.
In OUT OF REVOLUTION, the backward
development not only acknowledges the primacy of Time but witnesses
the continuity of the generations. Time is an element of salvation,
not damnation. One can admire Rosenstock-Huessy’s faith at the time
of the writing, 1938, when Stalinism and
Fascism were squashing Europe. The historical and political squeeze
soon deprived the European his autonomy, his life becoming less and
less his own and more the state’s, as Ortega wrote. Analogously,
Pinter’s characters suffer fates characteristic of the eternal love
triangle: their lives become less and less their own because they
are unable to circulate the “time poison” out of their
relationships.
Rosenstock-Huessy recognized the crisis and refused to turn away.
He actively engaged his world as a swimmer would the wall of a pool,
propelling himself from it forward into the past toward something
beyond the daily eternities.
In applying the lessons from Rosenstock-Huessy’s book to the
teaching of history or education generally, we should not
necessarily look to the school or classroom to work “magic.” That
is, we shouldn’t expect an administrative directive or national
standards to guide teachers. It would be too much to expect the
powers that be to understand that the accumulation of facts is not
enough. Nor should students look forward to a time when detailed
factual knowledge is expendable. How can we make anyone understand
the wisdom that “we must allow our young people a deliberate amount
of ignorance lest their genius be stifled,” he wrote in
THE FRUIT OF LIPS.
Could we as a society extend this wisdom and curb the infinite
excitements of our everyday life? Could we not deliberately limit
ourselves to a modest range of resources? Limit the information
flows? How can we protect students who are being drowned in a flood
of meaningless facts, when we are unaware that the very forms that
protect them from historical illiteracy have eroded? Will this alarm
merely become lost amid all the other calls for the “improvement” of
our educational institutions?
The imprecision of the concept “unhistorical” compels me link it
to something experienced but indefinable. Rosenstock-Huessy’s
historical work, like OUT OF REVOLUTION,
teaches us how to sneak the unhistorical into the classroom: in the
form of an aesthetic principle. By this I mean that history teachers
will consciously lessen their information flow and more sharply
design their lessons. Sooner or later, an effective application of
their teaching may lodge itself in students’ minds, and the students
in turn will sneak the unhistorical back into society. Perhaps they
will turn off their televisions for a few years and pay attention
more closely to their own sense of the shape of things. Eventually,
the information flow will slowly adjust itself to levels students
can handle.
Notes:
1 He makes the greater claim in THE HIDDEN
BOOK IN THE BIBLE that one writer was
responsible for a large part of the Old Testament.
2 Scenes 1 & 2 — Spring 1977; 3 — Winter 1975; 4 — Autumn 1974;
5, 6, & 7: Summer 1973; 8 — Summer 1971; 9 — Winter 1968.
Bibliography:
Boston, Bruce. “I RESPOND ALTHOUGH I
WILL BE CHANGED”: The Life and Historical
Thought of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. Ph.D. dissertation,
Princeton University, 1973
Brinton, Crane. THE ANATOMY OF
REVOLUTION. New York: Vintage, 1965
Hirsch, E.D. CULTURAL LITERACY. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1987
Lessing, Doris. THE WIND BLOWS AWAY OUR
WORDS. New York: Vintage, 1987
Nietzsche, Friedrich. THE USE AND ABUSE
OF HISTORY. Trans. by Adrian Collins.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957
Ortega y Gasset, José. MAN AND CRISIS.
Trans. by Mildred Adams. New York: Norton, 1962
Pinter, Harold. BETRAYAL.
New York: Grove Press, 1978
Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen. I AM AN
IMPURE THINKER. Norwich, Vt.: Argo Books,
1970
_________. THE FRUIT OF LIPS, OR WHY
FOUR GOSPELS. Pittsburgh, PA: The
Pickwick Press, 1978
_________. THE MULTIFORMITY OF MAN,
Norwich, Vt.: Argo Books, 1973
_________. THE ORIGIN OF SPEECH,
Norwich, Vt.: Argo Books, 1981
_________. OUT OF REVOLUTION:
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN MAN. Norwich,
Vt.: Argo Books, 1969
_________.“The Predicament of History,” The Journal of
Philosophy, September 1935
Smith, Page. HISTORY AND THE HISTORIAN.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964
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